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9.1  Korea’s Exchange Rate Management, 1970-95 
9.1.1  Exchange Rate Regimes 
Korea maintained a de facto dollar peg regime until the end of  the 1970s, 
although the system, started in  1965, was  officially called a unified floating 
exchange rate system. The exchange rate of the Korean won against the U.S. 
dollar was fixed until it appreciated considerably in real (effective) terms, seri- 
ously deteriorating export competitiveness. There were relatively large nomi- 
nal devaluations in 1971, 1974, and 1980. 
Entering the 1980s,  proper management of the exchange rate was considered 
all the more important for Korea since the government began to expand trade 
liberalization, phasing out various export subsidies and import protection mea- 
sures. In early  1980, a new exchange rate system was adopted in which the 
Korean won  was supposed to be pegged to a basket of currencies for major 
trading partners. The new  exchange rate system was designed to maintain a 
more stable real effective exchange rate (REER) of the Korean won when there 
are large fluctuations in  the exchange rates of  major trading partners. The 
REER is considered the best indicator for assessing the competitiveness of 
exports in the world market. 
However, in practice, Korea’s currency basket system did not aim at a rigid 
peg. In actuality, the authorities did not disclose the weights applied to the 
currencies of  major trading partners, and policy considerations seem to have 
played an important role in managing the exchange rate. In fact, the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) classified the regime as managed floating, and the 
REER of the won had exhibited sizable fluctuations during the 1980s. 
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In March 1990, a new exchange rate system known as the “market average 
rate” system replaced the former multicurrency basket peg system. Under this 
system, the basic exchange rate of the Korean won against the U.S. dollar was 
determined in the market within a specified range around the weighted average 
interbank rates of the previous day. The rates against other foreign currencies 
were then determined by the U.S. dollar rate of the currencies in international 
foreign exchange markets. An important feature of this new system was that it 
allowed market forces to play a part in determining exchange rates, thereby 
laying a basis for the market to become more efficient and moving toward a 
free-floating regime in the future. 
The imposition of  a limit on daily fluctuations of  the exchange rate was 
designed to avoid exorbitant movements of the rate in the exchange market, 
which was still shallow and inefficient. However, the range of allowed daily 
fluctuations had steadily widened in several steps. At the start, the limit, in 
either direction, was set at 0.4 percent of the weighted average of the interbank 
rates of the previous day, but it was expanded in several steps to 2.25 percent 
in December 1995. The government plans to further widen the band of daily 
fluctuations and ultimately lift the band in accordance with the maturation of 
the exchange market. There was evidence that the volatility of the daily won- 
dollar rate had increased in accordance with the continued widening of the 
band allowed for daily fluctuation under the market average rate system (Kim 
1993). This, however, did not mean that the exchange rate had been unstable 
in the long run. Actually, the REER had apparently been more stable in the 
1990s under the market average rate system than in the 1980s.’ 
9.1.2  The Exchange Rate as an Instrument of Macroeconomic Management 
In the early 1970s, the Korean won continued to depreciate against the U.S. 
dollar while the Japanese yen  continued to appreciate under a floating ex- 
change rate system introduced in 197 1.  As a result, the won showed substantial 
depreciation on a real effective basis, though this depreciation quickly disap- 
peared because of Korea’s high inflation rate. 
During the latter half of the 1970s, the won remained fixed to the U.S. dollar 
in spite of  Korea’s fairly high inflation. Thus the won appreciated on a real 
effective basis even though the Japanese yen continued to gain strength against 
the U.S. dollar. Notwithstanding the adoption of the multicurrency basket peg 
system and a 20 percent devaluation in 1980, followed by  a steady nominal 
depreciation of the won against the U.S. dollar, the won’s REER moderately 
appreciated until 1982. Then the won depreciated relatively steeply on a real 
effective basis until mid-1986. This trend was due mainly to two factors. First, 
1. Oum and Cho (1995) report that the standard deviation of the REER (quarterly average) in 
the 1990s (up to the third quarter of  1995) was 0.025,  while it was 0.113 in the 1980s. Their REER 
is based on data for Korea’s 14 major trading partners with time-varying trade weights. Similar 
results have also been reported by Kim (1992) and Kim (1995). 237  Evaluation of Korea’s Exchange Rate Policy 
although Korea’s domestic prices showed relative stability, the won’s nominal 
exchange value vis-h-vis  the U.S.  dollar depreciated continuously through 
1986. Second, the strong performance of  the Japanese yen  against the U.S. 
currency since 1985 accelerated the effective depreciation of the Korean won. 
As Korea’s current account registered sizable surpluses (largely with the 
United States) as of  1986, the Korean won was under immense pressure from 
the United States to appreciate. The won showed an unprecedented apprecia- 
tion against the U.S. currency, from an average of 881 won per dollar in 1986 
to 671 won in  1989. The won’s real effective exchange value also climbed, a 
result not only of the nominal appreciation but also of the renewed strength of 
the U.S. dollar. After 1989, Korea’s international payments position deterio- 
rated, reversing the upward trend in the won’s nominal exchange value vis-h- 
vis the U.S. dollar to a downward slide. Meanwhile, the exchange value of 
the Japanese yen against the U.S. currency showed a rising trend from 1991. 
Consequently, the  won  depreciated substantially on  a real  effective basis, 
reaching in 1993-94  approximately the same level as in 1986-87,  despite Ko- 
rea’s relatively higher rate of inflation (see table 9.1). 
In real effective terms, the won’s exchange rate had by and large maintained 
a relatively stable trend compared with those of  most other currencies, yet it 
had nonetheless shown considerable fluctuations in one period or another. One 
major factor in these fluctuations was that the won’s exchange rate had been so 
heavily biased toward the U.S. dollar that changes in the exchange rate between 
the U.S. currency and the currencies of other major countries, particularly Ja- 
pan, had not been immediately reflected in the exchange rate of  the won. It 
seems that there is approximately a one-year time lag before a change in the 
exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and other major currencies even par- 
tially affects the value of the won vis-h-vis the U.S. dollar. The decline in the 
won’s  REER in both the 1972-73  and the 1986-87  periods was thus largely 
due to the appreciation of the Japanese yen against the U.S. dollar (see fig. 9.1). 
However, an analysis indicates that the differentials in the rates of inflation 
between Korea and its major trading partners have been relatively quickly re- 
flected in the won’s exchange rate against the U.S. dollar. This may very well 
have been inevitable if Korea’s export prices were to remain competitive while 
its rate of  inflation was relatively high. It was also shown that the won’s ex- 
change rate against the U.S. dollar was influenced by Korea’s domestic macro- 
economic conditions as well. 
Evidence exists that adjustments of the exchange rate have frequently been 
aimed at ensuring an adequate level of foreign exchange reserves and correct- 
ing imbalances in the current account. For instance, a real depreciation was 
called for to improve the external balance when concern over the growing ex- 
ternal debt heightened in 1985. However, as the current account showed a siz- 
able surplus in the following years with improvements in the external terms of 
trade, the Korean won underwent substantial appreciation. 238  Sang-Woo Nam and Se-Jong Kim 
Table 9.1  Trends in Exchange Rates 
Nominal Exchange Rate  Nominal  Real 
Effective  Effective 
Won per  Won per  Exchange  Relative  Exchange 























































































































































Sources: IMF, International  Financial Statistics  (Washington, D.C.,  various issues);  Bank  of 
Korea. 
Note: Calculation of effective exchange rates was based on a trade-weighted currency basket of 
Korea's four major trading partners: the United States, Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom. 
Relative price was calculated using the wholesale price index. 
'1985-86  = 100. 
This tendency to use current account performance as an indicator of  the 
need for exchange rate adjustments seemed to have resulted in notable swings 
in the REER due to the time lag between a change in the exchange rate and its 
impact on the current account balance (Kim 1994; Oum and Cho 1995). All 
other factors being equal, the won's exchange value against the U.S.  dollar had 
also tended to appreciate when the rate of inflation was relatively high, as the 
government tried to stabilize domestic prices. Finally, there seem to have been 
attempts to promote exports by  depreciating the won during periods of  slug- 
gish domestic economic activity (see tables 9.2 and 9.3; see also Nam 1988). 239  Evaluation of Korea's Exchange Rate Policy 
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Fig. 9.1  Real effective exchange rate and current balance (percent of GDP) 
Table 9.2  Estimation of Nominal Exchange Rate (e), 1968-94 
Dependent Variables 
Explanatory Variablea  In e  Aln e 
Constant  -0.58  0.013 
(Wn  (p,m  0.630 (2.60)  0.695 (4.00) 
(P,lP*,)L,  0.358 (1.56)  0.142 (0.80) 
(A)ln e*  0.008 (0.04) 




,969  .588 
0.55  1.93 
"Explanatory variables are in differences in logarithms for the second (Ah e) equation. 
The Korean government has continuously relaxed its foreign exchange re- 
strictions, and it announced in December 1994 a foreign exchange reform plan 
that will be implemented in three stages until 1999. While easing restrictions 
helps the exchange market expand and become more efficient, it exposes the 
market to greater shocks and potential instability. A particularly serious con- 
cern during this transition period is the potentially large inflow of capital re- 
sulting from full liberalization. 
In order to cope with this situation in a noninflationary way, the Korean won 
may have to be substantially appreciated. Sterilized intervention in the face of 
a large capital influx is likely to raise the domestic interest rate, which will 
further encourage foreign capital inflow. However, nonsterilized intervention 
in the foreign exchange rate will soon result in real appreciation due to the 
acceleration of inflation. Actually, in recent years the Korean won appreciated 
moderately as the net inflow of capital grew much larger than the current ac- 
count deficit. For the Korean economy, which has a relatively large trade sec- 240  SangWoo Nam and Se-Jong Kim 
Table 9.3  Estimation of Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) 
Dependent Variable: In REER 
ExplanatoIy Variable  (1)  (2) 
8.09 
-0.248  (3.88) 
-0.571  (3.23) 
-0.878  (1.69) 
-0.328  (1.77) 
-0.027  (3.51) 
-0.216  (2.86) 




-0.424  (4.97) 
-0.878  (4.61) 
-1.360  (2.81) 
-0.823  (3.38) 
-0.029  (4.42) 
-0.197  (2.99) 
-0.009  (1.84) 
-0.568  (2.71) 
,789 
2.39 
Note: e, e* = exchange rate of the won and the currency basket of Korea’s major trading partners 
per U.S.  dollar, respectively. p,,  p*, = wholesale prices for Korea and Korea’s major trading part- 
ners, respectively. y,  Y = GDP in real and nominal terms, respectively. py = GDP deflator. CAP, 
CB = balance of payments in the capital and current accounts, respectively. RESIM = the ratio 
of foreign exchange reserves to total commodity imports. TOT = external terms  of trade. 
tor, a sharp currency appreciation is likely to bring about a recession in the 
economy as well as growing deficits in the current account? 
9.2  Long-Run Behavior of the Exchange Rate 
For a country like Korea, where the share of trade in the economy is signifi- 
cant, a two-sector model with tradable and nontradable sectors seems desirable 
for macroeconomic analysis of the exchange rate. Evidence indicates that rela- 
tive price movements between tradables and nontradables have been substan- 
tial in most countries with a generally rising trend. However, the price ratios 
have shown differing trends (slopes) among countries, as well as divergences 
from the trend for individual countries. 
The apparent lack of  purchasing power parity  (PPP) among countries is 
largely attributable to the existence of  nontradables. As noted by  Krueger 
(1983, 67), with the existence of  nontradables, PPP would hold only if trad- 
ables and nontradables were close substitutes in production, or if trade led to 
factor price equalization and the technology for producing nontradables were 
identical across countries. 
2.  There is a claim that Korea’s exchange rate management has been asymmetrical, moving 
closely with the dollar when the Japanese yen is strong and moving closely with the yen when it 
is weak. To examine this claim, we tried two different variables for e*, one for the period when it 
appreciated over the previous year and the other when it depreciated. The coefficients were almost 
the same, strongly indicating that the claim of asymmetry is ill founded. 241  Evaluation of  Korea’s Exchange Rate Policy 
For tradables, we may assume that PPP holds at least in terms of rates of 
change: 
where p,  and p$ are the domestic and world prices of tradables, respectively, e 
is the exchange rate expressed in units of domestic currency per U.S. dollar, 
and a hat indicates the rate of change. In this form, we may disregard arbitrage 
and transport costs, as long as these costs constitute a stable portion of  the 
commodity price. If, for example, the currency is not fully depreciated to re- 
flect domestic inflation over that of the world for tradables, the country would 
face an unsustainable backslide in export competitiveness and a deterioration 
of the trade balance. 
As presented in figure 9.2, the long-run movements of Korea’s exchange rate 
and tradable prices relative to the United States have been very similar, even 
though a substantial gap persisted in some periods. In the case of Japan, the 
yen  has appreciated much faster than tradable prices have dropped relative to 
the United States. This divergence may be due to a large exchange rate mis- 
alignment at the beginning of the sample period or to the inappropriateness of 
the price indicator for tradables used in the analysis3 
On the other hand, given the internal mobility of resources in the long run, 
we may expect a roughly similar trend of profitability between tradables and 
nontradables in the domestic market. Otherwise, resources would shift from 
the sector for which profits are relatively squeezed to the other sector until 
profit prospects are more or less equalized between the two. Given that labor 
cost constitutes the major and fairly stable share of total value added even for 
tradables, not to mention nontradables, we may  state the above equalization 
condition as follows: 
where  1, and 1, and 1,  are unit labor costs (wages per unit of  production) for 
tradables and nontradables, respectively. 
Using the observation that wage increases are more or less the same in the 
long run between the tradable and nontradable sectors, the above condition 
may be rewritten as 
3. Manufactured goods were taken as tradables for this purpose. Even though agricultural prod- 
ucts can be classified as tradables in many countries, the Korean agricultural market is far from 
being closely linked with the world market. The agricultural sector, however, is not classified as 
nontradables either. The fact that the yen appreciated much faster than tradable prices declined 
compared with the U.S. counterparts seems to indicate that the tradables relevant for analysis 
of the exchange rate might be a segment of the manufacturing sector with realized or potential 
comparative advantages. 242  Sang-Woo Nam and Se-Jong Kim 
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Fig. 9.2  Exchange rate and price of tradables 
Note: A, Korea vis-8-vis the United States (1982 = 1.00). B, Japan vis-8-vis the United States 
(1980 = 1.00). 
(3) 
where d, and d, are labor productivities for tradables and nontradables, respec- 
tively, and an asterisk indicates the corresponding variable for the world econ- 
omy. In the long run, we expect that the price increase for nontradables will be 243  Evaluation of Korea's  Exchange Rate Policy 
higher than that for tradables to the same extent that labor productivity growth 
in the tradables sector is faster than that in the nontradables sectot4 
Figure 9.3 shows that relative prices and the labor productivity gap between 
tradables and nontradables grew the fastest in Korea and at about the same rate 
over the 1970-93  period, as equation (3) predicts. For the United States, the 
relative price of nontradables rose at a slower rate than the gap in labor produc- 
tivity indicated. This difference may be due to a relatively large increase in 
nonlabor costs for tradables, which was expected in the sector's extensive re- 
structuring efforts for survival. For Japan, this phenomenon might have been 
offset by the downward pressure on the price of tradables that resulted from 
the gradual opening of the domestic market. 
Now,  the overall inflation rates of the domestic and world economies are 
given as the weighted average inflation of tradables and nontradables in the 
respective economies: 
(4) 
where p and p* are the composite prices of the domestic and the world econ- 
omy, respectively, and a  and p are the shares of  the tradables sector in the 
domestic and the world economy, respectively. 
Using the relationship of  equations (3) and (4) in equation (l), we get the 
following equation for exchange rate change (see Balassa 1964; Hsieh 1982): 
(5) 
where g(d)  and g(d*) are the gaps in labor productivity growth between trada- 
bles and nontradables for the domestic and the world economy, respectively 
(it  -  2" and 2;  -  2:).  If we ignore the difference in the share of the tradables 
sector in the domestic and world economies and let the common share for 
nontradables be +, equation (5) is rewritten as 
(6) 
The above equation shows that the exchange rate movement departs from 
what PPP predicts to the extent that  the gap in  labor productivity growth 
i?  = (ij - j*)  - [(l - a)i(d) - (1 - P>i(d">l, 
e^  = (j  -  j*)  - +&d)  - i(d*)]. 
4. If we also consider the share of nonlabor cost, eq. (3) may be rewritten as follows: 
A* 
(3')  in  - i,  = (4 - 4)  + [sn(Gn - 1.)  - st(G,  - [,)I9 
where s, and s,  are the shares of nonlabor cost for tradables and nontradables, respectively, and A, 
and A,  are the increase rates of nonlabor cost for tradables and nontradables, respectively. In eq. 
(3'), the second term on the right-hand side is most likely negative, since the nonlabor share for 
tradables is typically larger than that for nontradables (s, >  s,)  and the difference in the increase 
rate of nonlabor cost between nontradables and tradables is not likely to be larger than that of unit 
labor cost (A" -  A, <  1, -  1J.  In other words, the difference in inflation rates between nontradables 
and tradables is likely to be a little smaller than the difference in productivity growth between the 












,  '  Productivity Gap 
'  ' 
-0.4  4 
-0.4  - 
-0.6 - 
70'  *  74 '  '  '78'  n  85' "  8b' "  sb'  '  -0.8  ' 
/  Relative Prices 




Fig. 9.3  Relative prices and productivity gap 
Note: A, Korea (1982 = 1.00). B, United States (1980 = 1.00). C,  Japan (1980 = 1.00).  Relative 
prices  are In(prices of  nontradabledtradables).  Productivity gap is In(productivity of  nontrad- 
abledtradables). 245  Evaluation of Korea’s Exchange Rate Policy 
between tradables and nontradables for the domestic economy is different from 
that for the world economy. In the process of rapid catch-up with industrializa- 
tion efforts, a developing country will generally experience a fairly large gap 
in labor productivity growth, which tends to appreciate its currency. The degree 
of appreciation will be greater with a larger or increasing share of  the nontrad- 
able sector in the economy. 
Figure 9.4 shows the movements of labor productivity for tradables and non- 
tradables in Korea, the United States, and Japan. As expected, labor productiv- 
ity grew much faster in Korea than in the other two countries for both tradables 
and nontradables, but the growth for tradables was generally faster than that 
for nontradables after the mid-1970s. Between the United States and Japan, 
Japan’s labor productivity grew faster, but the relative productivity trend be- 
tween tradables and nontradables was roughly the same for the two countries. 
In figure 9.5, the predicted exchange rate on the basis of  equation (5) in a 
logarithmic form is presented together with the actual exchange rate. The equa- 
tion is clearly a poor predictor of the exchange rate in the short run for both 
Korea and Japan. In the long run, the won has slightly appreciated given what 
was expected in light of the differences (between Korea and the United States) 
in overall inflation and in the productivity gap between tradables and nontrad- 
ables. This seems to be due mainly to the relative stability, compared to produc- 
tivity, in the prices of  nontradables in the United States. For Japan, the pre- 
dicted exchange rate is hardly different from that based on relative prices of 
tradables in figure 9.2. 
In the above analysis, the exchange rate is viewed as being determined in 
the goods market. To  the extent that the exchange rate is determined in the 
broader exchange market where both current and capital transactions are made, 
long-run exchange rate movements may deviate from predictions based on the 
above framework. In Korea, however, controls over external capital transac- 
tions have been fairly extensive, rigorously matching demand with supply in 
such a way as to keep capital transactions largely accommodative.  Thus ignor- 
ing capital flows in the long-run analysis of exchange rate determination should 
not be too much of a problem for Korea. 
9.3  An Econometric Model: The Exchange 
Rate and Adjustment Mechanisms 
9.3.1  The Model 
There are well-established alternative approaches explaining the adjustment 
mechanism through which an exchange rate change affects the trade balance. 
These  approaches are  not  necessarily mutually  inconsistent, but  they  are 
largely complementary to one another in understanding the effect of  an ex- 
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Fig. 9.5  Exchange rate movements: actual versus expected 
Note:  A, Korean won (1982 = 1.00).  B, Japanese yen (1980 = 1.00). 
The elasticities approach is concerned with how an exchange rate change 
affects the trade balance by concentrating its attention on price elasticities of 
exports and imports. While the elasticities approach sees the trade balance di- 
rectly as the difference between exports and imports, the absorption approach 
pays attention to the trade balance as the difference between aggregate income 
and expenditure. Unlike the elasticities approach, which is solely concerned 248  Sang-Woo Nam and Se-Jong Kim 
with the price effects of an exchange rate change on exports and imports, the 
focus of the absorption approach is on the effects on income and expenditure 
(absorption). The immediate impact of an exchange rate change is on absorp- 
tion, which at a given level of income determines the trade balance. 
The monetary approach understands the adjustment mechanism of an ex- 
change rate change as a monetary phenomenon. Devaluation raises domestic 
prices to reduce the real value of the money stock and induces people to cut 
expenditure below real income to replenish lost real balances. This excess sup- 
ply of  domestic goods is matched by  net exports. Deficits in the balance of 
payments are considered to be a symptom of monetary disequilibrium, which 
is  only  transitory  and  self-correcting  without  sterilization.  If  this  self- 
correcting process is to be accelerated, deliberate monetary contraction can be 
pursued, and devaluation is viewed as a substitute for monetary contraction. 
This basic monetary argument is based on the assumption of factor price flex- 
ibility, which allows an economy to maintain full employment. 
The  model estimated in  this paper  combines some features  of  the  ap- 
proaches sketched above. Export and import functions include both relative 
prices and income variables. The determination of  absorption is an integral 
part of the model, along the lines of the absorption approach. The model, how- 
ever, departs from the elasticities and absorption approaches in that it intro- 
duces essential dynamics. It does not depend on the critical role of the money 
stock. Still, as is the case for the monetary model, devaluation leads to a reduc- 
tion in the real money stock and a change in the interest rate that tends to 
improve the  trade balance by  discouraging absorption. Though  small, the 
model incorporates most of the essential dynamics of determining the current 
account. The complete model including identities is as follows. 
Current balance and external debt 
Aggregate income 249  Evaluation of Korea’s Exchange Rate Policy 
Injlation 
Money and interest rate 
current account balance 
net balance of invisible trade and unrequited transfers, except for interest 
gross external debt 
residual item in the external debt identity, which includes changes in both 
payments on gross external debt 
foreign asset holdings and the value of nondoilar debts outstanding 
(due to their exchange rate changes against the dollar) 
exchange rate per U.S. dollar 
average exchange rate per dollar in the base year of national income 
exchange rate of the Japanese yen per U.S. dollar 
average interest rate on external debt 
a measure of import liberalization 
volume of commodity imports 
broadly defined money supply 
real money supply (M2) 
unit value of commodity imports in dollars 
unit value of world imports in U.S. dollars 
domestic wholesale prices 
unit value of commodity exports in dollars 
GDP deflator 
real interest rate 
world trade volume 
volume of commodity exports 
residual item in the real GDP identity, which includes net services exports 
(except for interest payments on gross external debt) and statistical dis- 
crepancies 
accounts 
absorption in real terms 
agricultural value added in real terms 
In an effort to keep the model as small as possible, the services balance is 
treated as exogenous except for the interest payment on the gross external debt. 
Endogenizing external debt and the interest payment is considered important 
since they constitute essential elements of the dynamics of the model. To  the 
extent that services trade is also affected by relative prices between the domes- 250  SangWoo Nam  and Se-Jong Kim 
tic and world markets, the model will underestimate the effect of an exchange 
rate change on the balance of payments. 
Exports 
The quantity and price of merchandise exports are viewed as being deter- 
mined by the intersection of their demand and supply curves. For Korea’s ma- 
jor exports the number of competitive suppliers is typically limited due to 
product differentiation or noncompetitive industrial organization, making the 
price-taker assumption of a small open economy unrealistic. Export demand 
is determined by foreign income or total world trade volume and the relative 
export price of the country compared to the rest of the world. The exchange 
rate affects demand only by  changing the export price. To the extent that Ko- 
rean exports compete closely with Japanese products, movements of the Japa- 
nese yen will also affect Korean exports. 
Export supply depends mainly on the profit margin captured by  the unit 
value of exports relative to the major costs represented by domestic wholesale 
prices and the unit value of (intermediate) imports, as well as the production 
capacity. The growth rate of export volume (2) is included as a proxy for the 
export capacity utilization ratio. Moreover, if  Korean exports have a particu- 
larly competitive relationship with those of Japan, the value of the yen  may 
also affect the pricing of Korean exporters: for example, reducing prices to cut 
the profit margin as the yen weakens. 
Imports 
Contrary to the case of exports, Korea may be considered to be “small” as 
far as imports are concerned, so that the unit value of imports is assumed to be 
exogenously given. Real imports are a function of real income or output and 
the cost of  imports relative to domestic wholesale prices. Since it is likely 
that (manufactured) exports are more dependent on imports of  intermediate 
or capital goods than other components of aggregate demand, absorption and 
exports are entered separately as explanatory variables. Furthermore, import 
liberalization or external terms of trade (p,/p,)  may have affected imports if 
import restrictions were binding or imports were compressed due to unfavor- 
able terms-of-trade movements. 
Absorption 
Absorption is composed of private consumption and investment and public 
expenditure. Private consumption may be viewed as depending on permanent 
income and estimated by  current income and lagged consumption. Public ex- 
penditure is budgeted on the basis of anticipated aggregate income. To the extent 
that current or anticipated income is not fully known to consumers or the govern- 
ment, absorption is expected to be negatively affected by changes in income. Fi- 
nally, explaining private investment as a partial adjustment to the desired capital 
stock (which may be approximated by  current income) and ignoring capital 251  Evaluation of Korea’s Exchange Rate Policy 
depreciation, investment may be estimated by  changes in income and lagged 
investment. Credit availability and interest rate  variables are also included 
since they will certainly affect absorption by changing the degree of liquidity 
constraint, profit prospect of investment, or time preference of consumers. 
Znjlation 
How  domestic inflation is determined is critical to the dynamics of  the 
whole system. Devaluation is believed to have no lasting effect because infla- 
tion accelerates such that the relative price of domestic goods tends to return 
to the predevaluation level. On the cost side, the major sources of  inflation 
include import prices and labor and other factor costs, and the latter may be 
estimated as an expectation-augmented Phillips curve. Labor productivity im- 
provement will have a role only to the extent that it is not fully reflected in 
current wages. Since labor productivity usually moves procyclically the Phil- 
lips curve relationship (captured here by the economic growth rate, j)  will be 
weakened by the offsetting effect of productivity change. 
The lagged dependent variable is supposed to be closely related to the ex- 
pected inflation rate. The growth rate of  agricultural production (jag)  is also 
introduced, as it is often the major determinant of agricultural prices. The in- 
flation rate in terms of the GDP deflator is added to the model, since wholesale 
prices are too narrow in their coverage to represent the whole economy. The 
effect of real money supply on absorption, for instance, should be better cap- 
tured when the nominal money stock is deflated by the GDP deflator. 
Real Interest Rates 
The real market interest rate is believed to have a downward trend with the 
deepening of Korea’s financial market. The M2-GDP ratio may serve as a mea- 
sure of financial deepening. Along this trend, the real interest rate is supposed 
to fluctuate together with cyclical swings of investment or general economic 
activity. Furthermore, as inflation accelerates or decelerates the change in the 
inflation rate may not be fully and immediately reflected in the nominal interest 
rate. This is so because the market takes only a portion of the change as a shift 
in inflationary expectations and because the authorities are likely to intervene 
to stabilize the nominal interest rate. 
9.3.2  Estimation Results 
Real Exports 
The demand elasticity of exports with respect to the world trade volume of 
manufactured goods was estimated to be 2.1 until the late 1980s. The elasticity 
was estimated as being lowered by  0.01 each year since 1988. The relative 
export price seems to affect exports with a mean lag of about one year, and the 
estimated price elasticity is 2.3. The exchange rate of the Japanese yen  also 
turns out to be significant, which strongly indicates that Korean products com- 252  Sang-Woo Nam and Se-Jong Kim 
Pete with Japanese products (or those produced in other East Asian countries 
by Japanese-invested corporations)  in a wide range of commodities. 
Unit Value of  Exports 
For a 1 percent increase in domestic wholesale prices or appreciation of the 
won, the unit value of exports rises by 0.50 percent in the same year, and about 
1 percent in  the long run. The unit value of  imports and the lagged export 
growth rate (introduced as a proxy for the export capacity utilization rate) also 
turn out to be significant. A weakening of the Japanese yen by  1 percent is 
estimated to bring about a decline in Korea’s export price by 0.2 percent or so 
in the short run. The 1973 dummy variable D(73) reflects the prevalent price 
controls in 1973, which distorted the PJe variable. 
Real Imports 
The income elasticity of imports is estimated at 0.90 for absorption and 0.29 
for exports. The impact of the relative price on imports is much smaller than 
that on exports, with the elasticity estimated at a little less than 0.5 and the 
mean lag at about six months. None of  the other variables such as external 
terms of  trade or measures of  import liberalization (average import tariff or 
import liberalization ratio) seem to have any impact on imports. 
Absorption 
The long-run elasticity of  absorption demand, with respect to income, is 
estimated at 1.0 with an impact elasticity of  0.38. The variable of change in 
income (Ay) was excluded since it was not significant and showed signs of 
multicollinearity with other income variables. The liquidity condition, mea- 
sured as a change in the real balance of broadly defined money, has a rather 
strong impact on absorption with some time lag. The real interest rate (corpo- 
rate bond yield) also turns out to be significant. The dummy variable D(80.90- 
91) incorporates the recessionary effect of  social and political turmoil in the 
wake of  the assassination of  President Park, as well as the strong boost of 
domestic demand (mainly housing construction)  in 1990-91  in response to the 
stagnation of exports (due mainly to a drastic appreciation of the won). 
Injation 
The short-run impact and the long-run effect of import cost on wholesale 
price inflation are estimated at 0.43 and about 0.85, respectively. The Phillips 
curve relationship (between inflation and recent economic growth) could be 
identified as well. As for inflation in terms of the GDP deflator, the short-run 
impact of import cost is much weaker, while the effect of economic growth is 
much stronger than it is for wholesale prices. The dummy variable D(73.74) is 
introduced to reflect the wide-ranging price controls (- 1) in 1973 particularly 
and the subsequent easing of controls (+  l), as they were no longer sustainable 
due to the oil shock in 1974.  The crop situation also turned out to be an impor- 
tant determinant of inflation. 253  Evaluation of Korea’s Exchange Rate Policy 
Real Interest Rate 
Though statistically not very significant, the real market interest rate turns 
out to decline with financial deepening and move procyclically.  It is also shown 
that only about half the change in the inflation rate is reflected in the nominal 
interest rate in the short run. Finally, a dummy variable is introduced to reflect 
the government’s monetary policy stance: a reflationary policy in connection 
with the 3 August 1972 measure of freezing the curb loan market (- 1) and the 
contrasting policy response to the first and second oil shocks (- 1 for 1974, 
+1 for 1979). 
Estimated Equations (Sample:  1968-94) 
1.  Real exports 
In  x  =  -4.20  + 2.13 In WT - 0.010  t(88) * In WT 
(8.16)  (3.72) 
2 
+  2.33  (1/3) ln(p:/px)-i  - 0.364 In ej, 
i=O 
(6.82)  (2.41) 
p  = 0.58,  R2 = .997,  D.W.  = 1.71. 
2. Unit value of exports 
lnpx = 3.19 + 0.489  ln(pw/e) + 0.419  A  Inpm 
(4.44)  (6.3  1) 
+ 0.234  Aln x-, - 0.205 Aln ej + 0.48  D(73) 
(2.83)  (3.39)  (2.12) 
+ 0.525 In p,-, , 
(4.37) 
R2 = .995,  D.W. = 2.17. 
3. Real imports 
In m  =  -0.102  + 0.8981nya + 0.292 lnx 
(10.9)  (6.70) 
1 
- 0.471 In 2 (1/2)(pm . e/pw)-i, 
,=O 
(3.11) 
R2  = .997,  D.W.  = 1.42. 254  Sang-Woo Nam and Se-Jong Kim 
4. Real absorption 
In y,  = 0.14 + 0.377 In y  + 0.613 In y,=, 
(4.98)  (7.99) 
+ 0.195  A In m, - 0.128 ln(l.O + 7) 
(3  .O 1)  (1.34) 
+ 0.054  D(80.90-91), 
(4.14) 
R2 = .999,  D.W.  = 1.41. 
5. Injlation: wholesale prices 
Alnpw =  -0.014  + 0.434  Aln(pm . e) + 0.374  Alny 
(0.90)  (1 1.8)  (2.26) 
- 0.388(0.6  A In y,,  + 0.4 A In yag-,) 
(3.67) 
+ 0.1 17  D(73.74) + 0.476  A In pw-,  , 
(7.28)  (8.19) 
R2 = .951,  D.W.  = 1.63. 
6. Injlation: GDP deflator 
A In py = -  0.035 + 0.217  A ln(pm . e) + 0.656  A In y 
(1.78)  (5.02)  (3.43) 
- 0.262  A In yag + 0.079  D(73.74) 
(3.35)  (4.60) 
+ 0.721  A In py-,, 
(8.87) 
R2 = .884,  D.W.  = 2.51 255  Evaluation of Korea’s Exchange Rate Policy 
7.  Real interest rate 
q  = -  0.041 - 0.030 1n(mr/y)..* + 0.182  A In y-l 
(1.64)  (1.57)  (1.60) 
- 0.510  Aln(py/py-,)  + 0.058  D(72.74.79) 
(5.31)  (4.84) 
+ 0.838  c-,, 
(12.7) 
R2 = .904,  D.W.  = 2.05. 
t(88) 
D(73)  1 for 1973,O otherwise 
D(80.90-91)  -1  for 1980, 1 for 1990-91,O otherwise 
D(73.74)  -  1 for 1973, 1 for 1974, 0 otherwise 
D(72.74.79)  -  1 for 1972 and 1974, 1 for 1979,O otherwise 
time variable since 1988, 1 for 1988, 2 for 1989, , . .  ,7 for 1994, 
0 otherwise 
9.4  Simulation Exercises under Alternative Exchange Rate Regimes 
Before undertaking simulation exercises under alternative exchange rate re- 
gimes, an assessment of the effects of  an exchange rate change is needed in 
order to check long-run stability and consistency with our expectations. Even 
though the proposed model has only several structural equations, this task can- 
not be achieved without running simulations because of the dynamic interac- 
tions among variables. To evaluate the long-run dynamics, the simulation exer- 
cises start in 1983 and continue to the end of the sample, 1994.5 
In order to obtain the net effect of  devaluation, the results of a simulation 
with the nominal exchange rate depreciated by 10 percent in 1983 and onward 
were compared with those of the base simulation. The results of this simulation 
are presented in figure 9.6. A notable result is that a devaluation quickly raises 
domestic prices, as much as 80 percent of the devaluation by the fourth year 
for wholesale prices, and between the fifth and sixth years in the case of the 
GDP deflator. As a consequence, exporters cannot reduce their unit export 
value very much (around 2.6 percent during the first two years, which declines 
to the 1.4 percent level between the fifth and sixth years), which limits export 
growth in real terms. The effect of  a 10 percent nominal devaluation on real 
exports is the strongest in the third year with 5.5 percent more exports and 
gradually weakens to 2.8 percent more by the eighth year. 
5.  In order to correct any simultaneous equation biases, two-stage regressions with instrumental 
variables were used for the simulation exercises. The results, however, were not significantly differ- 
ent from those based on ordinary least squares estimates. 256  Sang-Woo Nam and Se-Jong Kim 
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Fig. 9.6  Effects of 10 percent nominal devaluation in  1983 
On the other hand, higher prices result in lower real balance of money, which 
has a negative impact on absorption, while the lower real interest rate during 
the first several years partially offsets this negative effect. The net effect on 
absorption is slightly negative from the second to the fourth year of devalua- 
tion, before it becomes positive and increases thereafter. The combined effect 
of the 10 percent nominal devaluation on net exports and absorption leads to a 
real GDP level that is higher by 0.3 and 1.3 percent by the first and the fourth 
years, respectively. 257  Evaluation of Korea’s Exchange Rate Policy 
Real imports decrease due to higher import costs relative to domestic prices 
during the first two years after devaluation, but they are positively influenced 
as the long-run effect on GDP is positive. The effect on the current balance 
shows a J-curve pattern with little improvement in the short run, followed by 
the biggest improvement (about  1  percent of  GDP) between the third and 
fourth years and smaller and declining improvements thereafter (around 0.4 
percent of  GDP between the seventh and eighth years). This pattern results 
mainly from (1) the time lag between the exchange rate, unit export value, and 
real exports, (2) continually rising prices that weaken the initial gain in export 
competitiveness, and  (3)  the  slow  reaction  of  absorption  to  devaluation- 
induced income growth, leading to a steady increase in imports. 
9.4.1 
Thanks to its strong anti-inflation policy in the early 1980s, Korea achieved 
remarkable success in stabilizing prices by  1982. The consumer inflation rate 
dropped from an annual average of 23 percent during 1979-81  to 7 percent in 
1982 and 2.8 percent during 1983-87. As inflation decreased to a level more 
or less comparable to that of major trading partners, it must have been conceiv- 
able to have the Korean won fixed to the U.S. dollar. 
Keeping the nominal exchange rate fixed at the 1982 level means that the 
won was much stronger than it actually was during 1983-87. The average ex- 
change rate in 1986 was more than 20 percent weaker than it was in 1982. On 
the other hand, during  1989-90,  the actual exchange rate was  stronger (as 
much as 8 percent in 1989) than the 1982 rate. The result of this simulation is 
presented in figure 9.7.6 
Under this exchange rate regime real exports were 7 to 8 percent lower than 
actual levels during 1985-87, but 3 to 6 percent higher during 1989-91. The 
current account balance deteriorated the most in 1987, by 1.7 percent of GDP, 
while it improved by  1.2 percent in 1990.  As for GDP, a 1.8 to 2.0 percent cut 
occurred during both  1986-87  and 1993-94.  Finally, prices in terms of  the 
GDP deflator were lower by about 11 percent during 1986-87 and by 7 percent 
in 1994. 
Overall, there seems to be little evidence that this regime of a fixed nominal 
exchange rate vis-8-vis the United States is any better than the actual exchange 
rate management. Since the big swing in the nominal exchange rate that we 
observed during the sample period is avoided under this regime there are some 
improvements in the stability of export growth and the current account balance. 
However, these improvements are offset by a wider range of GDP growth and 
inflation rates. 
Fixed Nominal Exchange Rate since 1982 
6. The simulated values in the figure are obtained by adding the net effect (difference between 
the simulated values and the base simulation  results) to the actual values. 258  Sang-Woo Nam and Se-Jong Kim 
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Fig. 9.7  Simulation results: fixed nominal exchange rate against the US.  dollar 
since 1982 
Note: Actual (solid line) and simulated (dashed line). 
9.4.2 
Within the sample period, 1982 (the base year for our simulation exercises) 
was one of the years when the Korean won was most appreciated. By  1986-87 
and again in 1993-94,  the won  depreciated as much as 35 percent from the 
1982 level on a real effective basis. Thus keeping the won's REER at the 1982 
level might have meant substantially appreciating the currency. Still, 1982 is 
used as the base year since our major interest is the evolution of  economic 
profiles rather than absolute performance. 
Under the regime of fixed REER, the won's nominal exchange rate per U.S. 
dollar declined from 731 won in 1982 to 550 won in 1994 (compared with the 
actual exchange rate of 803 won per dollar). The results presented in figure 9.8 
show that real exports are much smaller than the actual volume, particularly 
during 1987-88 when the difference in exports was about 16 percent and dete- 
rioration in the current account balance was as large as 2.0 to 2.8 percent of 
GDP. Loss in GDP was about 4 percent during 1987-88  and over 5 percent 
during 1993-94, while the drop in the GDP deflator was 3.8 percent by  1988 
and 4.3 percent by  1994. 
Fixed Real Effective Exchange Rate since 1982 259  Evaluation of Korea’s Exchange Rate Policy 
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More significant for our present purpose is the path of macroeconomic per- 
formance. What is obvious from the simulation results is that export growth 
and the current account balance are relatively stable under the regime of fixed 
REER compared with their actual performance. For instance, between 1986 
and 1989, the actual increase rate of real exports dropped from 23 to 1 percent, 
while it declined from 17 to only 9 percent under the fixed REER regime. AS 
a result, the current account surplus, which amounted to 7 to 8 percent of GDP 
during 1987-88,  could be reduced to 4 percent of GDP. 
However, the simulation results also show that stability in export growth or 
reduced imbalance in the current account is sometimes achieved only at the 
sacrifice of other aspects of macroeconomic performance.  As the nominal ex- 
change rate immediately reflects the change in the exchange value of the cur- 
rency basket, inflation is also likely to be unstable with such large fluctuations 
in the currency value of  major trading partners as observed since the mid- 
1980s. Likewise, when domestic demand is very weak, as it was in 1992-93, 
keeping the REER mechanically fixed may not necessarily be rational. 
The case of a constant yen-dollar rate. Figure 9.9 indicates that even when the 
won’s  REER is maintained constant, the current account surplus remains at 
about 3 percent of  GDP during 1987-88.  In order to identify the extent to 
which these surpluses are due to the strong yen, another simulation was run 
with both the yen-dollar rate and the won’s  REER fixed at their 1982 rates. 
In  this case, the won’s nominal exchange rate vis-A-vis the dollar was much 
weaker: 756 won in 1994, compared to 550 won when the actual yen-dollar 
rates were  The results presented in figure 9.10 show that the large cur- 
rent account surplus during 1987-88 more or less disappeared in this scenario, 
7. With the constant yen-dollar rate Japan’s prices must have been higher than actual levels, since 
the yen showed a clear trend of appreciation against the dollar during the sample period. This effect 
is ignored in our analysis, and to that extent, the simulation represents a slight depreciation of the 
won on a real effective basis. 260  Sang-Woo Nam and Se-Jong Kim 
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Fig. 9.9  Simulation results: fixed real effective exchange rate since 1982 
Note: Actual (solid line) and simulated (dashed line). 
indicating the importance of the yen's  exchange rate in determining the com- 
petitiveness of  Korean  exports. One reason why  the  current account still 
showed a small surplus may be that the effect of an exchange rate change is 
somewhat underestimated by treating the services balance as exogenous except 
€or the interest payment on the external debt. 
9.5  Conclusion 
In Korea, a deficit in the current account is a vice, reflecting weakness in 
industrial competitiveness. A parallel is found in a firm's  capital structure: a 
low debt-equity ratio is considered good, while we all know that Korean firms 
could grow rapidly thanks to debt financing. As long as a firm has profitable 
projects (and the capacity to undertake them) whose expected return is in ex- 
cess of opportunity (borrowing) cost, it is senseless to increase reserves (not 
borrow) and forgo the projects. 
Despite Korea's high national savings rate, its capital accumulation is inade- 
quate, so investment demand is still strong. It is certainly in Korea's interest to 
expand investment by borrowing cheaply from abroad rather than seeking a 261  Evaluation of  Korea’s Exchange Rate Policy 
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Nore: Actual (solid line) and simulated (dashed line). 
current account surplus, which accumulates foreign assets whose yield is low. 
Keeping the currency overly depreciated for the purpose of improving the cur- 
rent account balance has other costs to the economy. Not only is it inflationary, 
it also disrupts smooth structural adjustments of  industries and exports in line 
with underlying shifts in comparative advantages. 
During the period of  “three blessings” in 1986-88,  Korean firms expanded 
their capacities in labor-intensive products to exploit the enhanced competi- 
tiveness that resulted from the strong Japanese yen. Many of these investments 
turned out to be bad as their price competitiveness soon worsened with soaring 
domestic wages, along with the sharp appreciation of  the Korean won.8 The 
exchange rate policy should have given a signal consistent with underlying 
changes in comparative advantages so that wasteful investments could have 
been minimized and industries could have better prepared for the challenge of 
upgrading the industrial and export structure. 
8. For one thing, the export share of light manufactured goods, which has shown a steady de- 
creasing trend, rose from 36.9 percent in 1985 to 41.6 percent in 1986-87. 262  Sang-Woo Nam  and Se-Jong Kim 
It has also often been suggested that intergenerational equity might be better 
served in Korea by lowering the savings rate rather than by increasing the (al- 
ready high) investment rate. However, older generation Korean parents, who 
have experienced a large improvement in their standards of living during their 
lifetimes, are likely to be satisfied with the current rate of  consumption in- 
crease for the younger generation, who will certainly see much smaller eco- 
nomic advancement. 
The current account balance is one of the key macroeconomic variables; it 
shows the extent to which investment exceeds national savings. In macroeco- 
nomic management, Korea always has a target for the current account that is 
considered as serious as that of  economic growth or inflation, particularly 
when it is in deficit. As preceding analyses indicated, the Korean authorities 
have heavily utilized the exchange rate for the purpose of correcting large im- 
balances in the current account, as well as securing other macroeconomic ob- 
jectives. 
With essential tasks assigned to the exchange rate one can hardly expect it 
to be determined or managed according to a rigid rule. A fixed nominal or real 
exchange rate against the U.S. dollar, for instance, was out of the question 
because (1) the government wanted neither to subject other macroeconomic 
policies to the exchange rate nor to lose the exchange rate flexibility that is 
expected to soften the adjustment to real shocks and (2) it would result in 
large variations in the effective exchange rate (with Korea’s trade share with 
the United States large but not dominating) when the dollar fluctuates against 
other major currencies. 
If correcting the imbalance in the current account is the major goal of ex- 
change rate policy, a country may  peg the (real) value of  its currency to a 
basket of  currencies of  major trading partners. This is actually what Korea 
claimed to have done throughout the 198Os, even though the pegging was fairly 
loose. Any rigid rule of  exchange rate changes deprives the economy of an 
instrument for fine-tuning macroeconomic management while compromising 
among different policy goals. The results of our counterfactual simulation ex- 
ercises clearly indicated that a rigid peg to a basket would have brought about 
larger fluctuations in inflation in exchange for a reduced imbalance in the cur- 
rent account during the latter half of  the 1980s. Furthermore, the recession 
with stagnant absorption during 1992-93  would definitely have been much 
worse with a rigid basket peg9 
For Korea, the trade weights used for forming the basket of currencies may 
be better if  they were replaced by  the elasticities that measure the respon- 
siveness of trade to exchange rate changes. Though it may not be easy to come 
9. If the authorities had actually chosen to keep the REER constant, other policy choices would 
have to have been different as well. E.g.,  when inflation dropped sharply due to a large nominal 
appreciation of the won against the dollar they could have let the repressed prices and fees adjust 
and repress again when the won depreciated, to make the actual fluctuations of  inflation much 
smaller than the simulation exercises showed. 263  Evaluation of Korea’s Exchange Rate Policy 
by reliable elasticities, we have seen in our analyses that Korea’s current bal- 
ance is substantially affected by a change in the value of the Japanese yen vis- 
&,is  the dollar even with the REER kept unchanged. 
This may not be surprising given Korea’s export structure, which has closely 
followed that of Japan with some lag. Currently, Korean exports such as cars, 
shipbuilding, and semiconductors and other electronics compete with Japanese 
products all over the world. Since the early 1980s, Korean exports have also 
been competing with products manufactured in East Asia by Japanese-invested 
firms whose competitiveness is substantially affected by the value of the yen. 
As such, the trade weight in the currency basket vastly underrepresents the 
Japanese yen if the REER is to be a correct reference for the competitiveness 
of Korean products. 
In reality, when the yen fluctuates relative to the dollar, the Korean won has 
typically remained much closer to the dollar in the short run than keeping the 
effective exchange rate unchanged would allow. Noting a similar pattern of 
exchange rate movements in other East Asian newly industrialized countries 
(NICs), Williamson (1991, 1995) interpreted it as a classic collective action 
problem caused by the fear of their competitiveness being eroded against the 
others. He then proposed a joint floating exchange rate system for the East 
Asian NICs with their currencies pegged to a common basket. Williamson 
argued that this system would not only make the countries avoid competitive 
depreciation but  also promote trade  and  financial interdependence among 
them. 
The chance of this scheme’s being adopted, however, seems rather low. As 
Black (1995) points out, these countries, though close competitors in the world 
market, have  their own economic policy problems, unique and significantly 
different among them. Korea, Black says, is ill advised to have its exchange 
rate management seriously constrained, as it faces its own program of external 
capital liberalization and the prospect of reunification, which will require ma- 
jor restructuring of industries. Another problem, as pointed out by  Park and 
Park (1991), is the lack of  strong political leadership necessary for bringing 
the countries to an agreement. 
Perhaps a more serious reason for skepticism is the increasingly differential 
export structure among the East Asian NICs. As these countries, some of them 
very small in size, move  out of  traditional labor-intensive exports, they have 
no other option than specializing in a limited number of industries where they 
find comparative advantages. Korea faces only limited competition with these 
countries in the markets for its major export items, such as cars, semiconduc- 
tors, steel, and shipbuilding. The idea of a common basket peg does not seem 
to be very appealing to these countries, whose competitive structures have be- 
come increasingly divergent. 264  Sang-Woo Nam and Se-Jong Kim 
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Comment  Stanley W.  Black 
My job as a discussant is difficult because Nam and Kim’s paper is a good one 
that I basically agree with, both in terms of its approach and its conclusions. 
Stanley W. Black is the Georges Lurcy Professor of Economics at the University of North Caro- 
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As a discussant, however, it is my  role to criticize, so I offer a few minor 
criticisms or suggestions. 
Section 9.1 of the paper addresses the measurement of  the exchange rate 
and its behavior over time. The choice of  currencies of  only four industrial 
countries (the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom) for the 
comparison basket to compare the internal and external purchasing power of 
the won excludes Korea’s growing trade with East Asia. As previously shown 
by Oum and Cho (1995), this can overstate the movement of the real exchange 
rate. This also appears in comparison between Nam and Kim’s figure 9.8B and 
figure 10.3 in my paper (Black, chap. 10 in this volume). The substantial real 
depreciation of the Chinese currency is omitted, for example. The paper needs 
to include a discussion of table 9.2 of the single-equation models of the ex- 
change rate. What should we conclude from these results? It would be interest- 
ing to test for asymmetry in the adjustment of the won-dollar rate to the yen- 
dollar rate. 
Section 9.2 discusses the long-run trends. Figure 9.2 gives a useful picture 
of the long-run trends in bilateral real exchange rates versus the U.S. dollar 
and the Japanese yen, traced to their roots in relative productivity trends in 
figure 9.3. Section 9.3 develops a structural model. While Nam and Kim’s 
model, based on past Korean exchange rate behavior, is dominated by trade 
factors, the recent capital account liberalization suggests that capital flows may 
play a more important role in the future. This is suggested also by the empirical 
results in the paper by Cho and Koh (chap. 11 in this volume). The estimated 
results of  the model seem quite reasonable to me. I was pleased to see that 
Nam and Kim’s estimated elasticities are quite similar to those estimated 10 
years ago by  Sung Kwack (1986) and used in my paper. I do wonder whether 
correction for simultaneous equations bias would lead to any differences. 
Section 9.4 offers simulations of  the model showing that  alternative ex- 
change rate policies such as a fixed nominal or fixed real exchange rate would 
worsen the behavior of inflation and output. This supports my argument that 
frexibility in the exchange rate is the more important goal for Korea, since the 
credibility of Korean monetary policy has been fairly well established. I note 
that in a recent paper Oum and Cho (1995) argue that Korean exchange rate 
policy in the 1990s has approximately stabilized their measure of the real ef- 
fective exchange rate, while figure 9.8B shows that is not the case for Nam and 
Kim’s measure. It is interesting to observe that the simulation with a constant 
yen-dollar rate removes most but not all of the large current account surpluses 
of the 1986-88  period. Since the high yen was only one of the “three bless- 
ings,” it would be interesting to see what effect a constant oil price and constant 
interest rate would produce. 
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COllXllellt  Leonard K. Cheng 
Nam and Kim’s paper provides a description of Korea’s exchange rate regimes 
from 1970 to 1995 and analyzes the long-run behavior of  the exchange rates 
of the Korean won, the U.S. dollar, and the Japanese yen by  focusing on the 
role of the productivity gap between tradables and nontradables. It then goes 
on to estimate an econometric model that captures three different approaches 
to the balance of trade, namely, the elasticities approach, the absorption ap- 
proach, and the monetary approach. Finally, the estimated model is used to 
generate predictions about the effect of  two hypothetical exchange rate re- 
gimes: (1) a fixed nominal exchange rate since 1982 and (2) a fixed real effec- 
tive exchange rate since 1982. 
I would like to commend the authors for their informative and systematic 
description of the Korean exchange rate regimes and their interesting results 
about the deviation of exchange rate movements from changes in relative pur- 
chasing power. As for the estimation of the econometric model, I have only 
one minor query. Since the volume of  imports is a function of  “absorption,” 
absorption is a function of  total output, and output is in turn  a function of 
exports, putting exports as a variable directly in the import demand function 
implies that exports have a higher import content than output used for domestic 
absorption (including domestic investment). What is the empirical evidence? 
The simulation results obtained from the econometric model suggest that 
both hypothetical regimes under consideration are inferior to the actual ex- 
change rate regime adopted in Korea. The intuition is that neither fixed ex- 
change rate system has the flexibility to deal with external shocks and changes 
in comparative advantage. 
While Nam and Kim’s counterfactual results seem to make good sense, I 
would suggest that the authors explore alternatives other than the two they have 
considered. This is not only because it would have been unrealistic for Korea 
to adopt a fixed exchange rate since 1982 (the United States began to exert 
pressure on Korea beginning in the mid- 1980s to bring about an appreciation 
of the won) but also because there might be regimes that could perform better 
than the one actually adopted. With  an appropriate multiobjective criterion 
function for the policymakers (such as a loss function capturing the key policy 
variables), the authors may even be able to search for an optimal regime, which 
can be compared with the actual regime. 
Leonard K. Cheng is professor of economics at the Hong Kong University of Science and Tech- 
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It is interesting to note that many  Koreans regard “a deficit in the current 
account as a vice.” When many countries are competing for foreign capital 
(both portfolio investment and foreign direct investment) to benefit their do- 
mestic economies, I wonder whether Korea’s preoccupation with a current ac- 
count surplus has much economic justification, because any effective transfer 
of real resources to Korea must take the form of a current account deficit. 
Overall, this is an excellent paper and I have  learned a lot from it about 
Korea’s exchange rate policy over the past two and a half decades. This Page Intentionally Left Blank